The Crisis That Was Not Prevented: Lessons for Argentina, the IMF, and Globalisation

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The Crisis That Was Not Prevented

Lessons for Argentina, the IMF, and Globalisation

Edited by Jan Joost Teunissen and Age Akkerman

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Abbreviations

BIS	Bank for International Settlements
CEPAL	see ECLAC
CPI	consumer price index
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and
Lobito	the Caribbean (of the UN); (in Spanish CEPAL)
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union (of the EU)
ERSP	exchange rate-based price stabilisation
LIKUI	programmes
EU	European Union
FDI	foreign direct investment
FDIA	International Fund for Agricultural Development
	(Fondo Internacional de Desarrollo Agrícola)
FONPLATA	Financial Fund for the Development of the
	River Plate Basin
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
GDP	gross domestic product
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IMF	International Monetary Fund
Mercosur	Southern Cone Common Market (in Latin
	America)
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
	Development
PPP	purchasing power parity
RER	real exchange rate
SDR	special drawing right
WPI	wholesale price index

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